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ABSTRACT
This article is devoted to the application of law in the legal order of the Council of Europe. It 
presents guidelines for the decision-making process of the application of law applied in the legal 
area of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter. The aim of 
this article is to present the characteristics of the decision-making process of the application of law 
in terms of human rights protection on European and supranational level, as well as the differences 
between such processes carried out on the basis of the ECHR and the ESC.
Keywords: human rights, legal order, decision-making process, the application of law, judicial 
type, controlling mechanism 
1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this article is to analyse the issue of the application of law in the 
legal order of the Council of Europe. This organization has created the world’s 
first regional system of human rights protection that covered all the European 
countries and thus elevated the decision-making processes for the application of 
law concerning human rights from the domestic to the international level.
This article attempts to show the disproportion between two suborders that 
function within the framework of the legal order of the Council of Europe: the 
European Convention on Human Rights (further referred to as the ECHR or the 
Convention) which protects first-generation rights, and the European Social Char-
ter which secures second-generation rights. The main goal is to present the inter-
institutional relations between domestic authorities and the Council of Europe 
bodies. These relations determine the processes of the application of law, both 
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on the European and domestic level; at the same time, they are different for each 
of the subsystems. The distinct character of the obligations assumed on the basis 
of those two legal acts has influence on the structure of the control mechanism, 
which in turn, determines the effectiveness of the operationalisation concerning 
human rights protection. The conventional control mechanism used in the judicial 
type of the application of law in the European Court of Human Rights (further 
referred to as the ECtHR or the Court) should be considered to be effective. How-
ever, the model determined by the ESC based on reporting and recommendation 
is not used in the judicial type and has limited effectiveness.
2. COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION IN EUROPE
The Council of Europe (CE) was founded on 5 May 1989 in London1 and is 
one of the organizations on the legal map of Europe that deal with the subject of 
human rights protection. Currently, from the perspective of over 60 years of its 
activity, one can and should emphasize its pioneering role in the realisation of the 
idea of human rights protection on the European level, which in time matured 
and grew to be an authority that determines the normative way of understanding 
standards for human rights protection. Today, we can treat as an axiom the words 
that highlight the undoubtedly great role played by the Council of Europe as an 
embodiment of the Pan-European cooperation; the words that stress the actual 
input of the Council of Europe into shaping the European identity and its great 
influence on the transformations in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe which 
have facilitated the creation of “the modern model of democracy, human rights 
protection and the rule of law”.2 
However, it should be noted that on the European, supranational level of pro-
tection, the CE is not the only organization that deals with these matters. The Eu-
ropean Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) are also worth mentioning.3 Furthermore, one cannot forget about the 
European scope of the UN activities concerning human rights protection.4 The 
European Union, created on the basis of the European Communities, focused at 
1 The Articles of Association were signed by the ministers from Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain and Italy. Those countries should 
be treated as the founders of the Council of Europe and therefore, as the pioneers of the European 
system of human rights protection.
2 P.A. Świtalski, Rola Rady Europy w systemie organizacji międzynarodowych, [in:] Rada Euro-
py a przemiany demokratyczne w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej w latach 1989−2009, 
ed. J. Jaskiernia, Toruń 2010, p. 13.
3 See more about the OSCE: L. Łukaszuk, A. Skowroński, Europejskie prawo pokoju i bezpie-
czeństwa. Materiały i komentarze, Warsaw 2003.
4 P.A. Świtalski, Rola Rady Europy…, p. 13.
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the beginning solely on the issues of economic integration. There was even a view 
that human rights protection is a matter of no impact on the processes of economic 
integration.5 Soon it turned out that the community law may be a source of human 
rights violations. Upon this discovery, the works on a community system of human 
rights protection started, and their crowning achievement was entering into force 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, following the Lis-
bon Treaty.6 The OSCE as a European regional organization was founded on the 
basis of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The movements 
to organize a European conference that would enter into talks about the security 
of – above all, but not exclusively – the European continent, should be dated back 
to the 1950s. However, the “iron curtain”, and more importantly, its consequences 
(the Cold War and the political antagonism between the East and the West) – cre-
ated a precipice which for many years made it impossible to convey such a meet-
ing of European countries. It only became possible at the beginning of the 1970s, 
as a result of many diplomatic efforts, and led to the signing of the Helsinki Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on 1 August 1975. 
The institutionalization of the cooperation in the field of European security within 
the framework of the Conference progressed in stages.7 Finally, during the sum-
mit in Budapest in 1994, the decision was made to transform the Conference into 
a regional organization.8 The transformation was finalized on 1 January 1995. 
Although the CE, the EU and the OSCE are organizations that do not share 
their objective scope of activities, their common denominator is human rights 
protection. The subjective perspective of these bodies differs as well. The sub-
jective scope of the OSCE is the broadest one because it extends beyond Eu-
rope and includes countries from North America and Asia. The Council of Europe 
includes almost all countries in Europe (except for Belarus), and the European 
Union currently functions on the basis of 27 member states. The disproportions in 
5 L. Leszczyński, B. Liżewski, Ochrona praw człowieka w Europie. Szkic zagadnień podsta-
wowych, Lublin 2008, p. 130.
6 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union was established and signed on 7 De-
cember 2000 during a summit of the European Council in Nice on behalf of the European Parlia-
ment, the EU Council and the European Commission. It was amended and signed again during 
a summit in Lisbon on 12 December 2007. It became legally binding under the Lisbon Treaty which 
was signed on 13 December 2007 and came into force on 1 December 2009.
7 More: P. Grudziński, KBWE/OBWE wobec problemów pokoju i bezpieczeństwa regionalnego, 
Warsaw 2002, pp. 35−43.
8 OSCE is an international organization with a regional character under Chapter VIII of the 
United Nations Charter. The composition of the OSCE may cause reflections on regionalism and 
regional organization, because apart from European countries such countries as the United States, 
Canada, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan 
are members of the OSCE. There are many opinions in the international law doctrine on how to de-
fine a regional organization. The main problem consists in establishing the criteria of regionalization 
that would not only concern the geographical aspect.
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the number of members ought to be mentioned not only because of statistics, but 
also due to the fact that formally the articles of association of these organizations 
do not introduce territorial delineations. Rather, the idea of membership is based 
on the criterion of the level of development9 and the requirement to fulfil all the 
formal prerequisites to become a member. It should be highlighted that the three 
organizations have an institutionalized character. As a result, the architecture of 
institutional Europe10 has been discussed in the context of evaluation of this state 
of affairs; it is so condensed that one should ponder the functionality of suprana-
tional network of European institutions, both in the context of relations between 
those institutions, and in the context of relations between an organization and its 
member states. The question arises – and it is justified when it comes to the subject 
matter, but extends beyond the scope of this study – whether the CE, the EU and 
the OSCE are organizations which are competitive against one another, comple-
mentary, or whether their activities are indifferent to each other.11 The author will 
not formulate any specific theses at this moment and on this subject. However, it is 
worth mentioning that critical opinions on these relations have been increasingly 
frequent in the professional literature. In her analysis of the judiciary activity of 
the European Court of Human Rights and the so called “co-governance of inter-
pretation” in the Court of Justice E. Łętowska mentions that “Silent assumption 
that there is a dialogue in this matter is too optimistic as currently this dialogue 
is more of a multitude of monologues”.12 In the relations between the ECtHR and 
the UN treaty monitoring bodies there is no formal legal framework of coopera-
tion.13 This means that in the environment of multi-centric law “putting into use” 
the common legal area of human rights interpretation and application is a difficult 
process that requires much effort, including procedural measures, compromise, 
and an approach that would be more universal. This kind of approach is crucial, 
because nowadays on both national and international levels, human rights are not 
only a philosophical category (although, in my opinion, they still are), but they 
9 B. Gronowska, T. Jasudowicz, M. Balcerzak, M. Lubiszewski, R. Mizerski, Prawa człowieka 
i ich ochrona, Toruń 2010, p. 81.
10 F. Benoit-Rohmer, H. Klebes, Council of Europe law. Towards a Pan-European legal area, 
Warsaw 2006, p. 156; P.A. Świtalski, Rola Rady Europy…, p. 14; idem, Miejsce Rady Europy w 
europejskiej architekturze instytucjonalnej, [in:] 60 lat rady Europy, Tworzenie i stosowanie stan-
dardów prawnych, ed. H. Machińska, Warsaw 2009, pp. 11−34.
11 More on these relations: J. Jaskiernia, Rada Europy, Unia Europejska i OBWE w systemie 
ochrony praw człowieka – synergia działań czy konkurencja?, [in:] Efektywność Europejskiego Sys-
temu Ochrony Praw Człowieka. Ewolucja i uwarunkowania Europejskiego Systemu Ochrony Praw 
Człowieka, ed. J. Jaskiernia, Toruń 2012, pp. 838–867.
12 E. Łętowska, Dialog i metody. Interpretacja w multicentrycznym systemie prawa (część II), 
„EPS” 2008, No. 12, p. 4. 
13 R. Wieruszewski, Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka a Komitet Praw Człowieka – rywali-
zacja czy współdziałanie, [in:] 60 lat Rady Europy…, p. 89.
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have become a legal category, too. For this reason the view that human rights 
are not a matter of philosophy is being expressed more often.14 The problems of 
relations between European institutions on the issue of human rights have been 
mentioned here to show that the Council of Europe is not the only organization in 
Europe that has the exclusive right and monopoly for guaranteeing human rights 
protection. The next part of this study will focus on the issue of the application 
of law in the legal order of the Council of Europe in reference to respect for and 
protection of human rights.
3. ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
3.1. Systemic issues
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms15 drafted in Rome on 4 November 1950 is an international agreement 
that protects personal and political human rights. Poland became a party to the 
Convention on 19 January 1993.16 This act is definitely a relevant one – it started 
the creation of the first in the world regional system of human rights protection, 
a system that is now considered to be the most effective17, a system that is per-
ceived as the core of the European law on human rights18; a system on which the 
Council of Europe bases its activities to a great extent. The possibility to attribute 
those characteristics to the Convention is dictated mostly by the innovativeness of 
the normative solutions adopted on the basis of the ECHR (above all, the institu-
tion of individual complaint and the implementation of the ECtHR decisions in 
national law) and the practice that has been shaped by these solutions.
The Council of Europe, founded in London in 1949, is the first institutional-
ized European organization which, from the European perspective, has a global 
range with its 47 member states. The Council of Europe focuses mainly, according 
to its articles of association, on promoting the idea of democracy based on respect 
for fundamental human rights and freedoms. Although within the organization 
over 200 conventions on human right protection have already been ratified, the 
institutionalized protection of First and Second Generation Rights is connected 
14 Idem, Od praw obywatelskich do praw człowieka – dylematy ewolucji polskiego systemu 
ochrony praw człowieka, „Studia Prawnicze” 2002, No. 2, p. 15.
15 M. Balcerzak is right when he writes that the original name of this agreement does not include 
the adjective “European”, although it is commonly used, as proven by this article. Cf. M. Balcerzak, 
Europejska Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności z wprowadzeniem, 
Warsaw 2011, p. IX. 
16 “Official Journal of Laws”, 1993, No. 61, item 284.
17 K. Drzewicki, Reforma Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka – filozofia zmian czy zmia-
na filozofii?, „EPS” 2006, No. 6, p. 4; W. Czapliński, A. Wyrozumska, Prawo międzynarodowe 
publiczne. Zagadnienia systemowe, Warsaw 2004, p. 433.
18 T. Jasudowicz, Administracja wobec praw człowieka, Toruń 1996, p. 20.
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with the two main conventions, namely the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Social Charter. These documents determine two sub-
systems, and the subsystem shaped by the ECHR is definitely more significant. 
This is generally dictated by the legal character of the ECHR and its immediate 
effect that has facilitated the creation of a control mechanism based on individual 
complaints.
Creating a regional-European system of human rights protection stemmed 
from the belief that such a system can guarantee human rights protection in a full-
er and more effective manner.19 There are many obstacles on the way to achieving 
this goal on a national level – the shortcomings of the judicial system, the way 
the normative regulations are formulated, and, finally, conscious and deliberate 
activity of public officers, which is in many cases concealed. The system of con-
ventional human rights protection, based on the activity of the Court of Human 
Rights, was established to reach a state of justice where the rights of an individual 
in a country are not violated. For an individual, the ECtHR serves as a guarantor 
of restorative justice when the individual seeks justice is Strasbourg because he or 
she cannot find it in their own country.
The convention system determines the relation between the Court and the 
member states of the Council of Europe based on the principle of subsidiarity. 
The relation results expressis verbis from art. 13 and 35, section 1 of the ECHR 
and is above all connected with the requirement to fulfil all the admissibility cri-
teria, among which the most important is the condition that the Court deals with 
a matter only after all domestic remedies have been exhausted (art. 35, sec. 1). 
This and other conditions position the Court as a body which is not meant to sub-
stitute domestic courts. The convention system is based on an assumption that an 
individual should pursue justice and find it in his or her own country. If human 
rights have been violated, authorities in the country have the primary competence 
to use its domestic bodies to verify the violation and to repair the state of affairs. 
The ECtHR functions as a supplementary body for the domestic judiciary system, 
which means that it is a body whose activities are of secondary character. The 
Court intervenes on the basis of a previously filed individual complaint only when 
domestic legal measures prove to be insufficient. 
The subsidiary character of the ECtHR’s position in reference to domestic law 
systems does not result solely from conventional normative solutions. It is also 
based on the judicial decisions of the ECtHR that has been consistent in its stand, 
starting from the “Belgian Linguistic case” from 196820, according to which “the 
Court cannot assume the role of competent national authorities, for it would there-
19 A. Wiśniewski, Koncepcja marginesu oceny w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw 
Człowieka, Gdańsk 2008, p. 16.
20 Belgian Linguistic case (case „relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages 
in education in Belgium v. Belgium), judgment from 23 July 1968, complaint No. 1474/62 et al.
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by lose sight of the subsidiary nature of the Convention.21 The national authori-
ties remain free to choose the measures which they consider appropriate in those 
matters which are governed by the Convention. Review by the Court concerns 
only the conformity of these measures with the Convention”.22 As a conclusion 
it should be stated that the subsidiary role of the ECtHR determines the nature of 
the European system of protection. It is justified both substantively, which is con-
nected with the fundamental role of a state as a guarantor of human right protec-
tion, and functionally, which refers to arguments from the proper activity of the 
Court in Strasbourg.
3.2. Legal character of the obligations resulting from the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and the decision-making process of the application 
of law
Objective development of international law norms included the issue of hu-
man rights in the system in the second half of the previous century. This pro-
cess was a result of an initiative of countries which experienced the tragedy of 
war and saw the shortcomings of the system of protection implemented solely on 
a national level; they decided to elevate the protection to the international level. 
Human rights – a subject of regulations that was until then entirely in the legisla-
tive authority of countries – entered the legal area of international law, became 
acquainted with it, strengthened its position and is still developing. However, this 
matter extended so far beyond the framework of classic international law that it 
gained the status of its separate branch.23 This sub-branch, which currently has the 
status of international human rights law, is now so complex that within its frame-
work one can classify treaties according to various criteria: for example, from 
the geographical point of view we have treaties that have universal24 or regional25 
character. If we base the criterion on the character of obligations, then we can 
21 Belgian Linguistic case (case „relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages 
in education in Belgium v. Belgium), judgment from 23 July 1968, complaint No. 1474/62 et al.
22 Ibidem, § 10.
23  A. Michalska, Prawa człowieka w systemie norm międzynarodowych, Warsaw – Poznań 
1972, p. 6.
24 System of universal protection started when the UN Assembly adopted the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights is based mainly of two treaties from 1966: the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights which came into force on 23 March 1976 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which has been binding since 8 January 1976. Apart from 
these documents the system includes an array of conventions which protect various aspects of hu-
man rights (e.g. prohibition of discrimination, tortures, human trafficking; protection of children’s 
rights, etc.) 
25 The process of establishing regional systems of human rights protection has its roots in Eu-
rope, where the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights 
were established. This pioneering system which protects human rights has become a role model for 
the regional systems that came afterwards: the Inter-America and African systems.
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distinguish international agreements that protect personal and political rights, and 
agreements that outline protection of economical, social and cultural rights. As-
signing a particular international agreement to one of the given criteria determines 
both the type and the process of the application of law. 
International agreements that regulate personal and political human rights, 
including the ECHR, have a structure that is very different from the agreements 
that we would refer to as ”classic”. They constitute a category of the so-called nor-
mative treaties with a vertical nature. They become effective on a horizontal level 
between countries, but they do not regulate relations between those countries. The 
purpose of such agreements is to shape the area of obligations of a state towards 
an individual (vertical level), which, given this individual the right to demand 
from the state, guarantees to resolve rights to whose protection the country com-
mitted itself by becoming a party to such an international agreement. Therefore, 
these agreements shape objective obligations of a state towards its individuals, 
and a normatively determined system of protection secures those obligations. The 
effectiveness of the system depends not only on the legal character of the obliga-
tions arising from the agreement, but also on the features of the decision-mak-
ing body established to protect the rights (whether it is a judicial or non-judicial 
body). The system may also function based on the principles stated in advance in 
an international agreement, based on the consent of the countries that express their 
will to become a party to the agreement through the act of ratification. Ratification 
is an act that not only confirms becoming a party to the international agreement, 
but is also an essential prerequisite for this agreement to become binding.26
When it comes to the entire scope of international law treaties, one may say 
that treaties protecting human rights have a distinct character. The structural dif-
ferences in the outline of international agreements, based on the criterion of focus-
ing on the obligation and distinguishing authorized subjects, exert influence on 
the nature of the decision-making process, and above all, on the differences in the 
process of statutory interpretation.
3.3. The decision-making process and its type in the application of law
The decision-making process in the ECHR order represents the j ud i c i a l 
t ype  o f  t he  app l i c a t i on  o f  l aw, since it was classified as such according 
to the basic criteria of judicial and non-judicial types.27 The European Court of 
Human Rights is an independent judicial authority with independent judges. From 
the point of view of the system, the Court has become almost omnipotent in its 
independence, and the freedom of judges is so great that it has allowed to create 
a specific statutory interpretation; an interpretative method applicable only in the 
26 A. Wyrozumska, Umowy międzynarodowe – teoria i praktyka, Warsaw 2006, p. 167.
27 L. Leszczyński, Typy stosowania prawa a model decyzyjny procesu decyzyjnego, this volume, 
pp. 27–47.
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ECtHR. The actions of the Court are based on its authority arising from the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. The rest of its features also comply with the 
judicial type. The proceedings are initiated mainly on the basis of an individual 
complaint, in other words, upon receipt of a claim or a motion. They focus on 
the litigation between a state and an individual, which is typical of the classic 
judicial type, although not exclusive to it (the judicial type may also be realized 
in the form of non-litigious proceedings). The decision on the application of law 
takes the form of a written ruling whose features extend far beyond the classic 
ones i.e., individual and specific character. Although the Court issues judgments 
in individual cases, they influence all the countries of the system through the stan-
dards that they establish. It should therefore be stated that although the proceed-
ings in the Court are similar to national-level court proceedings, they might be-
come relative only to a certain extent. This is determined by placing the decision-
making process in the European international area, where the countries accused 
of human rights violation are in various ways obliged to respect the judgements 
of the ECtHR. 
The decision-making process of the Convention system is carried out within 
the framework of a defensive mechanism, based on individual and inter-state (col-
lective) complaints. However, individual complaints play the dominant role from 
the point of view of the system, because they allow an individual to commence 
proceedings against a state which does not recognize that there has been a viola-
tion of human rights (or at least the individual’s perception is that there has been 
a violation). The relevance of individual complaint stems mainly from its sub-
stantive character. It empowers an individual in the international jurisdiction for 
human rights protection28 and therefore, allows to level-set the position of an indi-
vidual and a state during proceedings in the Court. Actually, individual complaints 
shape the European protection system, and it seems justified to call them the cor-
nerstone of the protection system.29 However, the relevance of the institution of 
individual complaint is also exposed through quantitative comparison due to the 
fact that each year there are over ten thousand of such applications, whereas there 
were only 19 inter-state applications submitted until 2000.30 Such an enormous 
disproportion indicates a marginal importance of inter-state applications. 
The decision-making process, at least when it comes to its initiation, is a con-
sequence of the subsidiary character of the European system of human rights pro-
tection. An individual application is subject to examination if it is recognized as 
28 A. Redelbach, Natura praw człowieka. Strasburskie standardy ich ochrony, Toruń 2001, 
p. 95.
29 B. Gronowska, Pozycja jednostki w systemie procedury kontrolnej Europejskiej Konwencji 
Praw Człowieka z 1950 r., [in:] Księga Jubileuszowa Prof. dra hab. Tadeusza Jasudowicza, eds. 
M. Balcerzak, A. Czeczko-Durlak, Toruń 2004, p. 162.
30 M. Jabłoński, S. Jarosz-Żukowska, Prawa człowieka i systemy ich ochrony. Zarys wykładu, 
Wrocław 2004, p. 245.
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admissible after fulfilling the admissibility criteria stated in art. 35 of the ECHR. 
The positive premises include the exhaustion of all the domestic remedies and 
observance of the period of six months to file a claim. The abovementioned ar-
ticle defines negative, formal and subjective obstacles that make it impossible for 
a claim to be examined by the ECtHR. The most important of the formal obstacles 
is that the case has already been submitted to another procedure of international 
investigation. The remaining obstacles include the anonymity of the complaining 
party and submission of a complaint that is substantially the same as a matter that 
has already been examined by the Court. Subjective obstacles include incompat-
ibility of the application with the provisions of the Convention on human rights 
and freedoms, or a situation where the application is manifestly ill-founded, or 
there has been an abuse of the right of individual claims. One should also mention 
the new admissibility criterion of significant disadvantage, introduced by Proto-
col 14. It is a rather controversial criterion. On the one hand, it allows to declare 
less important applications inadmissible, which will allow the Court to examine 
difficult applications with greater care. On the other hand, the statement that the 
applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage does not mean that there had 
been no violation of human rights. One could wonder whether it is not hypoc-
risy to establish a Court to shape European standards of human rights and their 
protection, while at the same time limiting the range of the protection only to the 
cases in which the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage. This solu-
tion is harmful for those whose rights were violated, but their disadvantage was 
not significant. However, one should remember that this amendment was caused 
by the inefficiency of the control mechanism that was unable to deal with the 
growing number of applications, and the idea behind the reform was to increase 
the effectiveness of the ECtHR. The value of effectiveness was considered more 
important, especially when faced with a real threat of a complete collapse of the 
control mechanism.
 All the admissibility criteria and the requirement to meet the criteria make 
it impossible to treat the Court as yet another court of appeal. Its function is to 
intervene in the domestic judiciary system if there is a violation of an individual’s 
rights unnoticed by the competent authorities. It is not the aim of the ECtHR to 
replace national courts, which is why the exhaustion of domestic remedies is so 
important. This criterion imposes on an applicant the obligation to use all acces-
sible measures that would allow domestic courts to take a stand on the allegation 
of infringement of the provisions of the ECHR.31 At the same time, the state has 
the possibility to redress human rights infringements within its internal judicial 
authorities. Assuming ideal conditions of a national system that fully respects the 
31 H. Bajorek-Ziaja, Skarga do Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka oraz skarga do Euro-
pejskiego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości, 2. Edition, Warsaw 2008, p. 28.
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ECtHR standards, it should be assumed that individual applications against such 
a state would not even be submitted to the Court.
The current procedure assigns the authority in assessing the admissibility of 
an application to three judiciary bodies, which in fact means a single-judge forma-
tion, a Committee of three judges and a Chamber of seven judges.32 Regardless 
of which particular body declares inadmissibility of an application, the decision 
is final and may not be challenged. A statement that “[…] over 90% of cases ex-
amined by the Court result in a declaration of inadmissibility”33 gains importance 
only when contrasted with the fact that for a few years now the ECtHR has been 
rendering decisions in nearly 1,500 cases per year. This shows how the Court is 
overburdened with applications and how important the issue of admissibility ex-
amination actually is. It is difficult to say with all certainty why the Court receives 
so many manifestly ill-founded applications, especially if we bear in mind that 
submitting such an application requires compulsory representation by a lawyer. 
One could risk a hypothesis that many applicants consider Strasbourg to be yet an-
other opportunity for an appeal. Unfortunately, this line of thought is completely 
faulty.
Declaring inadmissibility of an application may imply the beginning of pro-
ceedings in a Chamber, but it is not necessarily so in all cases, as all depends on 
the kind of infringement the ECtHR has to deal with. If the infringement is already 
the subject of a “well-established case law of the Court”, then pursuant to art. 1, 
sec. 1(b), the Committee may declare an application admissible and, at the same 
time, render a judgment on the merits. The abovementioned procedure has four 
effects. First of all, it is supposed to speed up the examination and judgment in 
obvious cases that are the subject of well-established case law. Second of all, it 
is supposed to more effectively stimulate countries to abide by the standards that 
are so obvious that they are not subject to any discussion. Third of all, it rein-
forces the precedent nature of the judgments of the Court. Finally, it is supposed 
to give a Chamber more time to carefully examine the merits of difficult cases. 
If no decision is taken or no judgment is rendered by a Committee, the authority 
passes over to a Chamber. The main task of a Chamber is to carry out the proceed-
ings and render a judgment which will determine whether a violation of human 
32 Articles 27, 28 and 29 of the ECHR define the appropriate sequence for declaring admis-
sibility. The filtrating function is realized mostly by single judges. That was also the assumption of 
Protocol 14. What is characteristic is that a single judge may declare an application inadmissible or 
not inadmissible. This means that a single judge representing the ECtHR cannot declare an applica-
tion admissible. If an application is not declared inadmissible then a Committee of three judges has 
to render its decision. If the Committee, under art. 28, cannot declare an application admissible, the 
decision is to be made by a Chamber.
33 L. Garlicki (ed.), Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności, Vol. 2: 
Komentarz do artykułów 19−59 oraz protokołów dodatkowych, Warsaw 2011, p. 76.
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rights has occurred. The Court examines the merits of the case together with the 
representatives of the parties who present their positions in writing. It is a task 
of a Chamber to gather evidence and for this reason, if necessary, to conduct its 
own investigation. Hearings are the oral part of the proceedings held in public, 
unless the Court in exceptional circumstances decides otherwise, e.g. because of 
social norms, wellbeing of minors, protection of private life etc. The aim of the 
hearing is to determine facts which constitute a basis for further, legal stages of 
the decision-making process, and in consequence lead to rendering a judgment.
The decision-making process concerns the biggest body of the ECtHR, the 
Grand Chamber, as well. The Chamber carries out its judicial function in two cas-
es. The first case is when a Chamber decides to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of 
the Grand Chamber. It happens when a Chamber is convinced that its resolution of 
a question might have a result inconsistent with the well-established judicial stan-
dard. Rendering such a judgment would create a threat of axiological destabiliza-
tion of the system, which would be very inconvenient from the perspective of the 
countries that are required to respect certain standards. In such situations, a panel 
of 17 judges of the Grand Chamber are to be responsible for rendering a decision. 
In the second case the Grand Chamber examines the case in a quasi-appeal proce-
dure, in which any party to the case may request a referral to the Grand Chamber 
within a period of three months from the date of the judgement (art. 43 ECHR). 
Such a request shall be accepted if the case presents a complex issue of general 
importance which causes difficulties affecting the interpretation or application of 
the ECHR. A panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber decides upon the level 
of complexity of the case. If the panel accepts the request, the Grand Chamber 
begins the decision-making process which results in a final judgment. The judg-
ments of a Chamber may also become final if reference to the Grand Chamber has 
not been requested by any of the parties within three months after the date of the 
judgment. The Committee of Ministers is responsible for the supervision of the 
execution of a final judgment (art. 46, sec. 2 ECHR).
3.4. Reasoning and argumentation in the decision-making process of the 
law application
The universal principles of interpretation stated in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties from 1969 (VCLT) constitute only a point of reference on 
which the ECtHR has founded its own interpretation rules that enable effective 
statutory interpretation of the general provisions of the Convention which take 
into consideration the developing social axiology and secure equal treatment of 
individuals irrespective of their nationality. The provisions of the VCLT which 
take the form of general rules of interpretation are only a starting point for the 
interpretative processes of the Convention and are insufficient. This is proved not 
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only by the fact that the ECtHR has created its own specific interpretative rules, 
but also by the small number of cases in which the Court used the VCLT’s rules 
for interpretation. M. Balcerzak conducted an enquiry as to the judicial decisions 
of the Court and came to a conclusion that between 1975 and 2008 the Court di-
rectly referred to the rules formulated in the Vienna Convention in only 35 cases.34 
It is an insignificant number, especially when compared to the number of judg-
ments of the ECtHR, which has recently gone beyond 1,500 cases a year. This 
means that the subject of regulation – human rights – and the different subjective 
scope and characteristic normative structure of the ECtHR influenced the direc-
tions concerning statutory interpretation which were applied only to interpret the 
Convention, and which are now called specific directions.
The specific directions concerning statutory interpretation, including autono-
mous and evolutive interpretation, and to a certain extent the margin of the ap-
preciation doctrine, are not only a supplement, but a necessary extension of the 
general rules of interpretation established by art. 31−31 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. The ECtHR has shaped its own methods of ECHR’s in-
terpretation and it is extremely important to stress the aspect of necessity in this 
matter, because the analysis of judicial decisions provides arguments sufficient to 
pose a thesis on a mutual relationship between the application of specific doctrines 
and semantic decisions. Although these are not the only directions available, they 
still constitute a crucial element that determines the interpretation of a particular 
meaning for the specific ECHR provisions.
The process of creating an interpretative approach based on specific directions 
has its roots both in the characteristics of the Convention and outside of it. The 
reasons for that include:
1)  The structure of the ECHR. Combining the rules of interpretative pro-
ceedings with the legislative structure of the Convention is obvious, due 
to the fact that a text is the subject of interpretation, and in the case of 
the Convention it is a specific text. The order of interpretative activities 
depends largely on the features of this text, among which we can mention 
clarity, precision of expression, high level of detail or the use of defini-
tions that are open for semantic analysis. 
2)  The interpreting authority – the European Court of Human Rights. This 
factor becomes especially important in the normatively-institutional set-
ting of the Council of Europe; probably even more important than in other 
legal systems. The importance of the Court results both from the responsi-
bilities assigned to it by the ECHR in the decision-making process based 
on application of the ECHR provisions, and from the fact that the Court 
34 M. Balcerzak, Zagadnienie precedensu w prawie międzynarodowym praw człowieka, Toruń 
2008, p. 175.
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is the only authority in Europe entitled to apply and interpret those provi-
sions.
3)  Human rights as the subject of interpretation. The Convention touches 
upon epistemological questions by forcing us to ask ourselves whether 
human rights actually exist, and upon ontological question, when we ask 
ourselves what those human rights are. This subject is especially prone to 
axiological and ideological analysis. 
4)  External conditions in which the Convention is applied. The constantly 
developing social relations and the changing economical and political 
environment certainly exert influence on how human rights and the lim-
its of their protection are perceived. All of those factors definitely have 
an impact on the form of the specific technique of interpretation of the 
Convention. The form, i.e. specific directions, has drifted away from the 
traditional techniques.
The evolutive doctrine is based on a well-established and currently accepted 
notion that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted ac-
cording to the present day’s conditions. This contestation was expressed directly 
in the judgment for the Tyrer v. UK35 case. The adoption of such an approach was 
caused directly by the expressions in the ECHR that have significant axiological 
potential. If we stop for a moment and consider terms such as private and family 
life, correspondence, assembly, marriage, discrimination, or personal safety, we 
have to agree that their meaning and understanding has been evolving for the last 
decades; this fact did not slip the attention of the Court. The ECtHR’s acceptance 
of evolution of such institutions as privacy or family makes it possible to classify 
the evolutive doctrine as a dynamic interpretation tool which enables us to adjust 
the meaning of terms to the changing reality of social, political and economic 
life.36 However, the evolutive interpretation of the Court is something more than 
dynamic interpretation. Because of the fact that in many cases the text of the Con-
vention includes only terms that have to be filled with meaning by the ECtHR, the 
judges are somewhat “sentenced” to activism – they have to create law through its 
interpretation. However, their freedom in this process is not unlimited. To the con-
trary: first of all, they have to observe the changing social relations, interpret them 
properly and create standards for protection. Second of all, they are limited by the 
VCLT and its provisions concerning interpretation in compliance with the subject 
and aim of the ECHR. Therefore, statutory interpretation is done strictly accord-
ing to its functional directions. However, for the meaning to be in compliance with 
the subject and aim of the Convention, it has to be interpreted dynamically.37 Con-
35 Judgment Tyrer v. UK from 25 April 1978, case No. 5856/72, § 93.
36 L. Morawski, Zasady wykładni prawa, Toruń 2006, p. 141.
37 D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the Convention on Human Rights, Butter-
worths, London, Dublin, Edinburgh 1995, p. 7.
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sidering all this, it should be highlighted that the evolutive interpretation doctrine 
is aimed at determining the current meaning of definitions and may be, therefore, 
classified as functional, dynamically-oriented interpretation.
The necessity to attribute meanings to the terms from the ECHR that are in-
dependent from their national-level equivalents was one of the bases for the au-
tonomous interpretation directions. The ECtHR shapes autonomous meanings of 
particular terms used in the Convention, thus creating a semantically independent 
grid of notions. This grid was established because of and for the purpose of cre-
ating a uniform understanding and application of the ECHR. Two dimensions 
may be attributed to the autonomous interpretation: the functional dimension and 
the justice dimension. The functional dimension enables the Court to become 
independent of the necessity to verify meanings that are attributed to particular 
terms in national legal systems. From the perspective of the economics of process, 
eliminating the need to verify the national definition of a given term, even if the 
semantic disparities are not significant, may allow the ECtHR to save consider-
able amounts of time. It is important due to the number of terms that are subject 
to autonomous interpretation, and due to the fact that they are legally relevant. 
These terms include: from art. 5 – “right”, “detention”, “other officer authorised 
by law to exercise judicial power”, “person of unsound mind”, “vagrant”, “alco-
holic”, “a person spreading infectious diseases”, “in accordance with the lawful 
arrest procedure”; from art. 6 – “court”, “charged in a criminal case”, “civil rights 
and obligations”, “criminal”, “witness”; from art. 7 – “punishment”; from art. 8 – 
“home”, “correspondence”; from art. 11 – “association”; from art. 34 – “victim”; 
from art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 – “property”; from art. 1 of Protocol No. 7 – “expul-
sion”. The Court verification of the material meaning of terms is not only aimed 
at a better efficiency of judgments. The rule of autonomous interpretation also has 
significant influence on harmonization of the national legal systems. At the same 
time, uniform understanding of the terms contributes to the establishment and 
maintenance of human rights protection standards.
The justice dimension is as important as the functional one. The autonomy of 
terms in the Convention is one of the guarantees for equal treatment of all citizens 
of the Council of Europe. Undoubtedly, a definition may influence the scope of 
guarantees for human rights protection. Various or even conflicting definitions 
of terms may cause variations in terms of human rights protection in particular 
countries, and thus lead to discrimination. The ECtHR could not approve of such 
a situation. To avoid this possibility, the rules of autonomous interpretation have 
been formulated.
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4. THE LEGAL ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER
4.1. Systemic issues
The European Social Charter (further referred to as the ESC or the Charter) 
was signed in Turin on 18 October 1961 and on that same day it became open for 
signature to the European countries that expressed the will to become a party to 
this international agreement. According to art. 35 of the ESC the required number 
of five ratifications was accomplished in 1965. Thirty days after the submission 
of the last instrument of ratification, on 26 February 1965, the Charter came into 
force.38 In the European legal area of the Council of Europe, the ESC serves as 
a supplement to the Convention. Unlike the ECHR which focuses on private and 
political rights, the Charter concentrates on rights that are “more difficult” to pro-
tect, so-called second-generation human rights that include social and economic 
rights. The main differences between this subsystem and the ECHR subsystem 
may be seen in the character of rights that are protected by the Charter, more spe-
cifically, in the scope of real guarantees given by the European countries.
The legal character of the obligations that ensue from the European Social 
Charter (which will be analysed in detail in the next part of this article) implies 
two main systemic consequences that also have significant influence on the deci-
sion-making process and the shape of the control mechanism. First of all, enter-
ing the ESC is not functionally combined with the membership in the Council of 
Europe. This is a major difference in comparison to the situation where becoming 
a member of the Council of Europe depended on the simultaneous ratification of 
the ECHR.39 Some say that the ESC does not have the same political support as 
the ECHR.40 It is true to some extent, because political support for the ideas of the 
Charter is determined by the pragmatism of the countries which want to assess 
38 27 countries are parties to the European Social Charter, including Poland which ratified the 
Charter on 25 June 1997. The Charter came into force in Poland on 25 July 1997. It is worth men-
tioning that on 3 May 1996 the Revised European Social Charter was adopted and opened for sig-
nature. It came into force on 1 July 1999. The revised Charter includes an extended array of obliga-
tions. Due to the extended scope of protection the Revised Charter is expected to further develop 
and replace the ESC. Currently both Charters coexist and both are binding. Poland signed the Re-
vised Charter on 25 October 2005. However, until this day the Revised Charter remains unratified. 
As a result, the European Social Charter is the only document analysed in this article.
39 At the beginning the membership in the Council of Europe did not depend on the ratification 
of the Convention due to a statement in the first sentence of art. 59 sec. 1 reading “(membership) 
shall be open to the signature of the members of the Council of Europe”. At the end of the 1980s 
the political structure of the Council of Europe changed and those two elements (membership in the 
CE and ratification of the ECHR) became strictly tied. Cf. Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka 
i Podstawowych Wolności, Vol. II: Komentarz do artykułów 19–59 oraz Protokołów dodatkowych, 
ed. L. Garlicki, Warsaw 2011, p. 455.
40 B. Banaszak, A. Bisztyga, K. Complak, M. Jabłoński, R. Wieruszewski, K. Wójtowicz, Sys-
tem ochrony praw człowieka, Zakamycze 2003, p. 141.
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their real abilities to fulfil the obligations arising from ratification of the ESC. 
Therefore, entering the ESC is about making a well thought-out and politically 
conditioned decision whose current number in Europe is limited. It is even more 
difficult to imagine a growing number of ratifications, especially in the face of the 
growing economic crisis. It seems that a reverse tendency will be visible, i.e. the 
countries that already are parties to the Charter will find it increasingly more dif-
ficult to fulfil their obligations as to guaranteeing the social and economic rights 
resulting from the Charter, especially in the times of the economic downturn and 
the disadvantageous financial situation. Most countries are aware of the fact that 
the dynamic economic situation may make an effective fulfilment of the obliga-
tions impossible. This is the reason for the cold calculation implemented by the 
countries while assessing their real abilities to fulfil the obligations. In the context 
of the entire system, making the membership dependent on becoming a party to 
the ESC would significantly limit the subjective scope of the Council of Europe, 
which at this moment is a European organization that has a European-global na-
ture. If such a dependency were to be introduced, the situation would be ridicu-
lous: the countries that are only parties to the ECHR would be left outside of the 
Council of Europe while fulfilling one of its main goals: respect for human rights 
and freedoms. 
The second consequence is the process of accession to the Charter which is 
still ongoing as evidenced by 44 ratifications41 out of the 47 member states of the 
Council of Europe.42 It is very likely that the process of ratification of the ESC 
will be discontinued due to the newer formula of the RESC, and the practice of 
resignation from the ESC and ratification of the RESC has already been observed. 
This is why the process of ratification has slowed down.
Paradixically however, due to the structure of commitments resulting from the 
RESC (as the revised Charter guarantees a higher standard of social and economic 
rights as well as 2. generation rights) and due to the current economic downturn 
in Europe, the status of party to the ESC will be more easily acceptable than the 
status of the RESC (as the RESC guarantees a more extensive body of rights). As 
of today, 14 countries have not yet ratified the revised Charter although as many 
as 12 countries have signed the RESC (and withheld its ratification).
4.2. The legal character of the obligations arising from the European So-
cial Charter
Stating the legal character of the obligations arising from the ESC is crucial 
if one wants to understand the decision-making process carried out on the basis 
of a subjective international agreement, and significant differences between this 
41 See: ibidem.
42 Data as of March 26, 2013 (http:/coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/social charter/Presentation/).
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approach and the classic approach towards the application of law understood as 
a decision-making process based on the competence of a particular subject to 
make individual and specific decisions.43 The decision-making process under-
stood within the framework of the ESC does not fit in this definition. Understand-
ing those differences is possible after the analysis of the Charter’s character and 
the characteristics of rights i.e. guarantees.
The European Social Charter is an international agreement that is closed for 
the countries which are not members of the Council of Europe. This fact does 
not actually influence the decision-making process. However, it does confirm the 
opinion that it may be a result of the inability to fulfil the second-generation rights 
standards by all the European countries. It should be highlighted that if we take 
into consideration the criterion of openness, the ECS is a typical agreement, be-
cause, as F. Benoit-Rohmer and H. Klebes put it, in the Council of Europe which 
is facing the tendency towards “opening the treaties” only 12 of the treaties are 
currently open to third parties.44
However, to understand the characteristics and the decision-making process 
of the ESC, it is crucial to understand the legal character of the obligations arising 
from it. The normative structure of the Charter makes it possible to distinguish 
a preamble and five following parts of the text, out of which the first one is an im-
plicit declaration of objectives, while the rest expresses the objectives explicitly, 
by stating the substantive, political and procedural provisions. The appendix to 
the Charter is also a part thereof, pursuant to art. 38. The Charter is supplemented 
with three additional protocols that expand the catalogue of substantive rights.45 
The characteristics of ECS’ substantive provisions is reduced to the options for 
each country as to what scope of obligations they want to assume from an array 
of the rights stated in the Charter. Each country has to assume five out of seven 
rights which are treated as the co-called “hard-core” provisions of the Charter.46 
Pursuant to art. 20, sec. 1(c) of the ESC, out of the rest of the rights referred to 
as “soft” provisions, a country has to select a number of articles leading the total 
number of articles by which a country is bound: no fewer than 10 articles of the 45 
numbered paragraphs. This solution means that when it comes to law and obliga-
tions, each country may be in a different position. Regardless of the fact that the 
43 More: A. Korybski, Application of law as an object of study: key concepts, issues and re-
search approaches, in this volume, pp. 13–25.
44 F. Benoit-Rohmer, H. Klebes, op. cit., pp. 104–105.
45 Additional protocol to the ESC from 5 May 1988. 13 countries are parties to this protocol (it 
came into force on 4 September 1992). Poland is not a party to this protocol.
46 Pursuant to art. 20 sec. 1(b) the hard-core rights of the ESC are: art. 1 – right to an occupation; 
art. 5 – right to freedom of association; art. 6 – right to bargain collectively; art. 12 – right to social 
security; art. 13 – right to social and medical assistance; art. 16 – the family right to appropriate 
social, legal and economic protection; art. 19 – migrant workers and their families have the right to 
protection and assistance.
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Charter grants the right to select articles and therefore the scope of obligations by 
which a country will be bound, in the assessment of many countries in the Council 
of Europe the threshold is still too high to allow them to become a party to this 
international agreement. This is, of course, connected with the character of the 
rights provided in the ESC. C. Mik writes about their character stating that “[…] 
although they regulate human rights, they do not undergo objectification”.47 This 
statement is true, which is confirmed by each of the 19 articles of Part 2 of the 
Charter. Each of these regulations includes the statement “With a view to ensure 
the effective exercise of the right […], the Contracting Parties undertake”. After 
this statement the aims (art. 1(1) – to accept as one of their (the Contracting Parties 
to the ESC) primary aims and responsibilities the achievement and maintenance 
of as high and stable a level of employment as possible, with a view to the attain-
ment of full employment), tasks (art. 3(1) – to issue safety health regulations), 
and assurances (art. 3(2) – to provide for public holidays with pay) that a country 
is bound to realise are presented in detail. In fact the ESC provisions are about 
a country’s obligations and not about subjective human rights to which an indi-
vidual is unconditionally entitled. The regulations in Part 2 of the Charter are not 
strictly formulated. They do not state the requirement for immediate realisation 
and in many cases they only constitute a programme with many, sometimes unde-
fined, conditions. This is exemplified by art. 2(1) which states that the countries 
undertake “to provide for reasonable daily/weekly working hours and the working 
week to be progressively reduced to the extent that the increase of productivity 
and other relevant factors permit”. The way in which the second-generation rights 
are stated in the Charter makes them subjective and not objective. This feature 
makes it impossible for an individual to effectively pursue his or her rights, re-
gardless of how the protection mechanism functions. Of course, the creators of the 
Charter were aware of that, and established a control mechanism suitable for the 
normative structure of the provisions, based not on an individual complaint, but 
on a procedure of audit of states. It is more of a monitoring tool and uses gentle 
influence rather than repressive measures against countries that violate the provi-
sions of the ESC.
4.3. The decision-making process
The decision-making process carried out within the framework of the ECS 
control mechanism in not exactly a process of the application of law in the mean-
ing that is presented in this article. However it has, in principle, the character of 
a decision-making process. Everything depends on assuming a certain termino-
logical convention. If we assume that the application of law should be understood 
47 C. Mik, Koncepcja normatywna prawa europejskiego prawa praw człowieka, Toruń 1994, 
p. 203.
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as a decision-making process carried out by a competent body in order to issue 
a specific and individual decision on the basis of which the allocation of rights 
and obligations is done, then the ESC control mechanism extends beyond that 
understanding of the process of the application of law. The decision-making pro-
cess carried out within the framework of the ESC control mechanism has different 
character. 
First of all it should be noted that the control mechanism was adjusted to the 
character of rights provided in the Charter. Moreover, one of the main bodies that 
determine the structure of the mechanism – the Committee of Independent Ex-
perts (CIE)48 – is not a judicial body. Seemingly, it was assumed that the control 
is not supposed to and does not have the character of court proceedings. This has 
significant influence on the shape of that mechanism which is rather based on re-
porting and recommendation. The procedure includes the following stages:
1)  Every two years each Contracting Party of the ECS has to prepare a re-
port on the realisation of obligations which ensue from the Charter. The 
reports are submitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
2)  Then the Committee of Independent Experts examines the reports to veri-
fy how the country fulfils its obligations, and draws up a report containing 
its conclusions. 
3)  The next step is the political analysis of the CIE carried out by the Gov-
ernmental Committee (GC) which draws up its own report for the Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
4)  On the basis of the report of the GC, the Committee of Ministers adopts 
a resolution containing individual recommendations to the countries con-
cerned.
The aim of the control mechanism is to assess how the Contracting Parties 
fulfil their obligations arising from the ESC. It is not supposed to be a way for 
individuals to pursue rights, which the country is bound to guarantee. The Com-
mittee of Independent Experts which draws up the conclusion is a quasi-judicial 
body. It carries out its proceedings by correspondence and the conclusion is not le-
gally binding, although it is sometimes called a decision and the Committee calls 
it “case-law”.49 Formally, the conclusion of the Committee is not a decision in the 
process of the application of law. It is rather an opinion that constitutes the basis 
for assessment of the Governmental Committee and re-assessment carried out by 
48 Committee of Independent Experts was established pursuant to art. 25 of the Protocol of 21 
October 1991 (procedural changes) which reformed the mechanism of abiding by the ESC. Pursuant 
to this article the The Committee should have at least 9 member selected by the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe. Currently the judges are selected by the Committee of Ministers, 
which decided upon the number of 15 judges.
49 This mode of referring to the Committe is described by A. Bisztyga in comment 71 to chap-
ter 4 [in:] B. Banaszak, A. Bisztyga, K. Complak, M. Jabłoński, R. Wieruszewski, K. Wójtowicz, 
op. cit., p. 143. 
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the Committee of Ministers that takes the form of a recommendation. The Com-
mittee of Ministers formulates recommendations if it finds out that a country is not 
fulfilling its obligations arising from the ESC. In this procedure it is important that 
the Committee of Ministers recommends undertaking particular measures aimed 
at fulfilling the obligations, and does not demand their application. It seems that 
the Committee cannot demand their application for many reasons, not only be-
cause due to their legal character, the recommendations have no binding power. 
The rights stated in the ECS are mostly structured obligations of the countries that 
those countries should realise and guarantee their citizens as far as it is reasonably 
possible in as short an amount of time as possible. Taking that into consideration it 
seems almost illogical to sanction those countries for their inability to implement 
the obligations. 
The recommendation of the CIE has an individual character since it is aimed at 
a particular Contracting Party. It is also specific, because measures that a country 
should undertake to improve their position are included in the recommendation’s 
content. Although the recommendation is individual and specific, it is not a typical 
decision on the application of law, and not only due to the lack of binding power. 
As to the merits this decision does not concern the entitled entity – an individual 
whose rights resulting from the ESC should be guaranteed. An individual is not 
entitled to submit an individual complaint, because the ESC rights are not objec-
tive and not immediately due. The control of the process of their realisation is 
therefore carried out with the exception of the interested individual. In fact, there 
are two aims of the ESC control mechanism. The first is to constantly monitor 
measures that the countries undertake to achieve the standards stated in the ESC. 
The second, a direct consequence of the first one, is to give countries sugges-
tions concerning particular measures and their strengthening in a situation when 
achieving the standards stated in the ESC is obstructed. The control mechanism is 
aimed at long-term measures which, after some time, should lead to the achieve-
ment of the rights guaranteed in the Charter.
4.4. Reasoning and argumentation in the decision-making process of the 
application of law
The decision-making process consists of consecutive stages. In each of the 
stages various measures are undertaken and various types of reasoning are im-
plemented. Their ultimate goal is to issue a decision on the application of law. 
Although each of those stages is very important, statutory interpretation, and es-
pecially reasoning and argumentation used at this stage of the application of law, 
constitute the central point of every decision-making process. Statutory interpre-
tation results in establishing a norm which is crucial for binding determination 
of facts and legal consequences in the form of decisions on the application of 
law. L. Leszczyński writes: “the content of the decision on the application of law 
Application of Law in the Legal Order of the Council of Europe
Pobrane z czasopisma Studia Iuridica Lublinensia http://studiaiuridica.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 20:17:13
UM
CS
94
contains the determination of the actual state of affairs from the perspective of the 
sanctioned legal norm and determines the legal consequences of this determina-
tion from the perspective of the binding sanctioning norm”50. This decision is 
isolated, due to the fact that it individualises the addressee, and specific, because 
it states his or her behaviour precisely. The decision on the application of law 
should in principle answer the question whether the norm has been infringed or 
not, whether the addressee of the norm infringed the law, and finally whether the 
subjective rights of the addressee of the decision were infringed.
The decision-making process understood in this way is not present within 
the framework of the ECS control mechanism. As stated before, the ECS control 
mechanism is based on reporting and recommendation. Its aim is to determine 
whether a country fulfils its goals and objectives to which it is bound by the ESC. 
The ESC obligations are not legally binding. Therefore, one cannot treat them as 
substantive human rights, the infringement of which would constitute a basis for 
asserting claims by means of judicial proceedings. For these reasons the decision-
making process differs significantly from the traditional understanding of the ap-
plication of law. As a consequence, reasoning and argumentation applied in such 
a decision-making process realised within the framework of the ESC are limited 
and restricted. There is no stage at which one would determine the actual state of 
affairs. The validation phase which is devoted to the verification of the legal status 
is limited only to the determination whether a country has undertaken legislative 
measures to fulfil the obligations arising from the Charter. It seems that at this 
stage functional arguments are of great importance. The countries are not required 
to fulfil their obligations. Therefore, the control mechanism does not include the 
reasoning from the stage of subsumption interpretation or the decisions concern-
ing an individualised entity, in this case – a natural person. The decision, in the 
form of conclusions of the Committee of Independent Experts, has the character 
of a non-binding opinion issued by a quasi-judicial body. At most, it may con-
stitute a basis for recommendations formulated by the Committee of Ministers. 
These recommendations are aimed at countries which, in the Committee’s assess-
ment, do not fulfil the obligations arising from the ESC.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The application of law in the legal order of the Council of Europe is an is-
sue which demonstrates the decision-making processes concerning human rights 
protection within the framework of the regional-European system of human rights 
protection. Establishing a supranational control within this order had significant 
50 L. Leszczyński, Zagadnienia teorii stosowania prawa. Doktryna i tezy orzecznictwa, Zaka-
mycze 2004, p. 17.
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influence on the modification of the decision-making process of the application of 
law in comparison to a process which was only carried out in a domestic legal area. 
The consequences of being a member of the Council of Europe concern mostly 
human rights protection realised on the basis of the ECHR. This convention con-
stitutes the core of the legal order. As regards the decision-making dimension, the 
consequences for the Contracting Parties to the Convention are as follows. First of 
all, the establishment of the institution of individual complaint has empowered in-
dividuals. This inspired the European Court of Human Rights to initiate a process 
of control over national-level decisions. Therefore, the principle of subsidiarity 
was used to elevate the control to supranational level. Second of all, the ECHR 
ratification makes a country fall automatically under the Court’s jurisdiction. The 
decisions of the Court are to be executed within the domestic legal order of each 
country. Third of all, all of the ECtHR decisions (not only those issued against 
a country) shape the standards of European human rights protection that should 
be implemented in all the countries of the Council of Europe. The implementation 
of those standards should influence the legislative processes of rulemaking carried 
out by the legislature and affect the application of law. The national courts (in the 
judicial type of the application of law) and administrative bodies (in the manage-
rial type of application of law) should consider the Convention to be a validating 
argument. On a national level, the judicial standards of the ECtHR should be con-
sidered to be interpretative arguments applied in the decision-making process of 
the application of law. The European Social Charter supplements the legal order 
of the Council of Europe. Due to the fact that the Charter guarantees second-gen-
eration rights, the control mechanism established on its basis has a different legal 
character. It does not have a judicial character and does not trigger a direct need 
to implement the decisions made by the auditing bodies. The aim of the control 
body is to prompt the countries to strive in their national laws for better and more 
effective safeguarding of the rights arising from the ESC.
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SUMMARY
In the present article, model-based features of the decision-making process of the application of 
law in the legal order of the Council of Europe have been presented. Neither the real assessment of 
the effectiveness of legal order nor the way in which Poland realises its obligations arising from the 
membership in the Council of Europe have been analysed, as such an analysis would require a sepa-
rate and completely different examination. Referring the application of law in the legal order of the 
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Council of Europe the guidelines for the decision-making process of the application of law applied 
in the legal area of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter 
were presented. Problems of the characteristics of the decision-making process of the application 
of law in terms of human rights protection on European and supranational level were discussed, as 
well as the differences between such processes carried out on the basis of the ECHR and the ESC. 
The demonstration of these processes requires a presentation of the relevant background in the form 
of a general overview of the Council of Europe in terms of human rights protection in Europe (the 
first part of the article). In later parts of the article, the following issues were analysed and discussed 
in details: systemic consequences associated with becoming a party to the Convention and to the 
Charter, the character of the obligations arising from the membership, the decision-making process 
and the reasoning applied within the process.
STRESZCZENIE
Niniejszy artykuł został poświęcony problematyce stosowania prawa w porządku Rady Europy. 
Przedstawia on założenia procesu decyzyjnego stosowania prawa realizowanego w obszarze praw-
nym Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka i Europejskiej Kary Społecznej. Zamierzonym celem 
artykułu było pokazanie specyfiki procesu decyzyjnego stosowania prawa w przedmiocie ochrony 
praw człowieka na europejskim poziomie ponadnarodowym, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem róż-
nic tego procesu, realizowanego na podstawie EKPC i EKS. Ich pokazanie wymagało przedstawie-
nia ogólnej charakterystyki Rady Europy i jej aktywności w obszarze europejskiej ochrony praw 
człowieka. Następnie w ramach zagadnień szczegółowych analizie poddano: sądowy mechanizm 
kontrolny poszanowania praw człowieka przez państwa, inicjowany na podstawie skargi indywidu-
alnej, realizowany przez Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka w ramach typu sądowego stosowania 
prawa; pozasądowy mechanizm kontrolny, realizowany przez Komitet Niezależnych Ekspertów, 
którego istotą jest ocena realizowania przez państwa-strony zobowiązań z EKS, a nie dochodzenie 
przez podmioty indywidualne praw z karty, do których gwarantowania państwo się zobowiązało. 
Te dwa zdecydowanie odmienne prawnie mechanizmy kontrolne wyznaczane są jako systemowe 
konsekwencje dla państw, związane z przystąpieniem do EKPC i EKS, charakterem zobowiązań 
z nich wynikających oraz możliwością ich gwarantowania i dochodzenia na drodze prawnej przez 
jednostki. W sposób zasadniczy wpływają one na przebieg procesu decyzyjnego stosowania prawa 
w porządku Rady Europy i rodzaje rozumowań wykorzystywanych w ramach tych procesów.
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